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Abstract—This paper considers an application of phase-only
digital encryption to the three-pass protocol leading to a new ‘no-
key-exchange algorithm’. After providing a study on the theoret-
ical background to the method, an algorithm is presented on a
step-by-step basis together with three examples of cryptanalysis.
A prototype MATLAB function is provided for validation of the
approach and for further development by interested readers.
Index Terms—Convolution, deconvolution, phase-only spec-
trum, stochastic phase function, cryptanalysis, three-way pass
protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important theme in the development of any encryption
algorithm, at least, within the context of a given encryption
model, is the ‘diffusion’ and ‘confusion’ that occurs in the
transformation of an (input) plaintext to an (output) ciphertext.
Confusion refers to condition that the correlation between
the key and the ciphertext is as complex and as intricate as
possible. Diffusion refers to the property that the statistical
distribution of the plaintext is dissipated in the distribution of
the ciphertext so that the statistical signature of the plaintext
is not present in the ciphertext [1]. Ideally, what is required
is a process that outputs a uniformly distributed ciphertext.
Encrypting data using a known cipher (with a uniform dis-
tribution) and a specific encryption process does not always
guarantee an output ciphertext with a uniform distribution.
However, what matters most, is that the distribution of the
plaintext is dissipated effectively over the full extent of the
plaintext. In this context, we consider the following encryption
model:
s(x) =
Stochastic Confusion︷ ︸︸ ︷
n(x) ⊗ f(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stochastic Diffusion
+ cn(x) (1)
where the functions f(x) - the information function, n(x) - the
noise function and s(x) - the signal, denote the the plaintext,
the cipher and the ciphertext, respectively. The operator ⊗
denotes the convolution integral and c is a constant. We refer
to the convolution operation n(x) ⊗ f(x) as the process of
(stochastic) diffusion and the addition of term cn(x) as the
process of (stochastic) confusion as illustrated in Equation (1),
both terms on the RHS of Equation (1) being stochastic
functions.
Stochastic diffusion is ‘maximized’ by ensuring that n(x)
is, ideally, uniformly distributed. Maximum confusion is then
determined by the extent to which n(x) dominates s(x) under
the condition that ‖n(x)⊗f(x)‖ << ‖cn(x)‖ which is clearly
determined by the value of c. This ensures that the statistical
signature of the ciphertext is determined by the cipher alone.
Judging from the open literature, and, to the best of the
author’s knowledge, the application of Equation 1 using a
phase-only cipher n(x) and its application to a three-pass
protocol is a new and original contribution to the field, given
that phase-only encryption methods have traditionally been a
prerogative of optical cryptography [2].
II. DECONVOLUTION FOR PHASE-ONLY FUNCTIONS
Given Equation (1), it is clear that in order to decrypt the
signal s(x) to recover the information f(x), it is necessary
to deconvolve s(x) given the cipher n(x). Application of a
phase-only cipher provides an exact and unique solution to
this problem. This is compounded in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1: If n(x) has a phase-only spectrum, then the
deconvolution problem associated with Equation (1) is well-
posed, i.e. f(x) can be recovered from s(x) exactly and
uniquely, except for the value of f(x) at | x |= 0 which
remains undefined.
Proof 2.1: Let Θ(k) be the phase function of a unit
amplitude phase-only spectrum such that
exp[iΘ(k)] = N(k)↔ n(x)
where ↔ denotes transformation to Fourier or k-space. Ap-
plying the convolution theorem to Equation (1), we can write
S(k) = exp[iΘ(k)]F (k) + c exp[iΘ(k)]978-1-5386-6046-/18/$31.00 © 2019 IEEE
where S(k) ↔ s(x) and F (k) ↔ f(x) and it is then clear
that
exp[−iΘ(k)]S(k) = F (k) + c
Hence, using the correlation theorem (where  denotes the
correlation integral)
f(x) + cδ(x) = n∗(x) s(x)
where δ(x) is the Dirac delta function. However, since the
function cδ(x) only affects the value of f(x) at | x |= 0 and
has no influence for all values of | x |> 0, we can write
f(x) = n∗(x) s(x), f(x = 0) = 0 (2)
which provides the solution for f(x) subject to what we call
the ‘re-normalization condition’.
Corollary 2.1: If, for any norm, we consider the ratio
R = ‖n(x)⊗ f(x)‖/‖cn(x)‖, then it is clear that R ≥
0 is a measure of the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) since
‖s(x)‖ ≤ ‖n(x)⊗ f(x)‖+ ‖cn(x)‖ leading to the inequality
‖s(x)‖/‖cn(x)‖ ≤ 1 + R. Hence, if we define the SNR as
1 +R, then Equation (2) shows that f(x), ∀ | x |> 0, can be
uniquely recovered from s(x) whatever the magnitude of the
SNR, i.e. however small the value of the SNR or equivalently,
however large the value of c becomes.
Remark 2.1: Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.1 are theoretical
results associated with the use of piecewise continuous func-
tions. Thus, the statement ‘however large the value of c’, is
null and void for applications involving numerical operations
on finite discrete arrays when the value of c becomes subject
to an upper bound that depends on the floating point precision
applied. In other words, the numerical value of c that is applied
places limits on the accuracy to which a discretized form of
f(x) can be deconvolved from a discretized form of s(x). A
detailed quantification of this numerical issue lies beyond the
scope of the paper but in general, for c = 10m, an m-bit
precision is required.
Remark 2.2: The results compounded in Theorem 2.1 and
Corollary 2.1 are of no intrinsic value to the deconvolution
problem in general which occurs in the applications of digital
signal processing, for example. This is because it can rarely,
if ever, be assumed that an Impulse Response Function is
characterized by a deterministic or stochastic phase-only spec-
trum. Further, natural noise can not, in general, be assumed
to be characterized by phase-only functions. Thus, it should
be understood that Theorem 2.1 is strictly only applicable
to the convolution model given in Equation (1) when n(x)
has a phase-only spectrum and thereby, has no applicability
to signal processing in general. However, as explored in this
paper, Theorem 2.1 does have applications in the area of cryp-
tography. This is because the diffused plaintext n(x) ⊗ f(x)
can be completely embedded in the (phase-only) cipher cn(x)
for c >> 1, thereby fully dissipating the statistical signature of
the plaintext in the distribution of the cipher. This maximizes
the ‘confusion’ of the ciphertext within the context of the
encryption model given by Equation (1).
III. ENCRYPTION USING PHASE-ONLY STOCHASTIC
FUNCTIONS
Consider the encryption model given by Equation (1) where
n(x)↔ exp[iΘ(k)], Θ(k) ∈ [−pi, pi]
The function n(x) is a cipher generated by some key depen-
dent algorithm characterized by a phase-only spectrum with
a random phase function Θ(k). For a plaintext function f(x)
that is real, the ciphertext is taken to be given by Re[s(x)]
and has some Probability Density Function (PDF) denoted by
Pr{Re[s(x)]}.
In Fourier space, Equation (1) now becomes
S(k) = F (k) exp[iΘ(k)] + c exp[iΘ(k)] (3)
and it is clear that the value of c controls the magnitude of
the term exp[iΘ(k)] compared with the term F (k) exp[iΘ(k)].
As c increases in magnitude, the spectrum S(k) becomes
dominated by the phase-only spectrum exp[i(Θ(k)]. Thus by
choosing a large value for c we can ‘embed’ the spectrum
F (k) exp[iΘ(k)] in the phase-only spectrum exp[iΘ(k)] in
the knowledge that F (k) can be recovered exactly as a
consequence of Theorem 2.1. For this reason, we refer to c as
the Spectral Embedding Coefficient (SEC).
This result is invariant of the phase function Θ(k) that
is chosen for c >> 1. The output will be dominated by
the stochastic behaviour associated with the PDF of n(x)
thereby eliminating the statistical signature associated with
the term n(x)⊗ f(x). Hence, the distribution of the plaintext
is dissipated in the distribution of the cipher through both
convolution (diffusion) and addition (confusion) but where the
addition of the cipher is the dominating effect for c >> 1,
subject to the floating point accuracy required to give a decrypt
with an acceptable accuracy, as discussed in Remark 2.1. It is
this observation that is fundamental to using Theorem 2.1 for
encryption.
Let the stochastic phase function Θ(k) be conditioned to
have a uniform distribution and wrapped between −pi and pi




2pi , ∀ξ ∈ [−pi, pi];
0, ∀ξ /∈ [−pi, pi].
There are two principal ways to compute the random phase
function Θ(k) ∈ [−pi, pi] ∀k: (i) Generate a normalized







(ii) Construct Θ(k) by taking the Fourier transform of a
random (uniformly distributed) variable r(x) ∈ [0, 1], say, i.e.
Θ(k) = atan2[R(k)], R(k)↔ r(x) (5)
In this case, atan2 is taken to yield the 4-quadrant phase
values in the range [−pi, pi] by computing one unique arc
tangent value in which the signs of both arguments are used
to determine the quadrant of the result, thereby selecting the
desired branch of the arc tangent. Since r(x) is real and has no
symmetry, R(k) has a symmetric real component and an asym-
metric imaginary component. The 4-quadrant phase function is
therefore an asymmetric function, i.e. Θ(k) = −Θ(−k). Thus
although Pr{| Θ(k) |} is uniformly distributed, the stochastic
signature of | Θ(k) | in one half-space is repeated in the other.
The two half-spaces are therefore not statistically uncorrelated.
The principal differences between the two approaches for
computing the phase function given above is that application of
Equation (4) requires the complex ciphertext to be used in or-
der to recover the plaintext, whereas Equation (5) requires only
the real component of the ciphertext to be retained. Application
of Equation (5) therefore reduces the data storage/transmission
requirements needed to recover the plaintext by 50% albeit
at the ‘price’ of using a stochastic phase function with the
property Θ(k) = −Θ(−k) and the computational overhead of
computing the spectrum R(k) from r(x) using, in practice, a
Fast Fourier Transform. For this reason, Equation (5) is used
to compute the stochastic phase-only spectrum.
IV. APPLICATION USING A THREE-PASS PROTOCOL
The principle of the Three-pass Protocol is well known as
are the algorithms that have been developed for its implemen-
tation. These include the Shamir three-pass protocol [3] and
the Massey-Omura method [4]. The principle associated with
the protocol is as follows: Alice encrypts her plaintext with
a known algorithm and private key KA, say, and sends the
ciphertext to Bob. Upon receipt of the ciphertext, Bob cannot
decrypt the ciphertext because he does not know KA. Instead
Bob encrypts the ciphertext using the same algorithm but a
new private key KB known only to Bob and sends the now
double encrypted plaintext back to Alice. Upon receipt, and
critically, assuming the encryption algorithm is commutative,
Alice can decrypt the doubly encrypted ciphertext with KA
and send the result (a single encrypted ciphertext) back to
Bob who is then able to decrypt the result using KB . By using
this protocol, Alice and Bob do not need to agree upon a KA
and KB a priori and thus, no separate key exchange method
is required. Three principal conditions for the application of
this protocol are required: (i) The encryption algorithm used
must be commutative and strong enough so that the ciphertext
cannot be broken using a known algorithm attack based on
an intercept of any pass, particularly the single encrypted first
and third passes; (ii) the keys used must be of a sufficient
length to make an exhaustive attack impracticable on any pass;
(iii) if the encrypted information is intercepted for each of
the three passes, it is not possible to determine the plaintext
from the three intercepts (assumed to be complete intercepts
in each case). It is the third of the conditions above that
yields the greatest vulnerability and any encryption system that
exploits this protocol must be based on algorithms that exhibit
some ‘computational difficulty’ in this respect. For example,
in the case of the Shamir and Massey-Omura algorithms,
the security relies on the difficulty of computing discrete
logarithms in a finite field [5]. In this section we consider
an application of the three-pass protocol using a phase-only
encryption (commutative) algorithm. As discussed further in
Section IV, the ‘computational difficulties’ of breaking the
ciphertext in this case are compounded in: (i) a lack of
knowledge on the exact value of the SEC that is used by
Alice in the first pass (and only the first pass); (ii) the inability
to solve the one-dimensional phase retrieval problem due to
the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra; (iii) the inability to
uniquely solve an under-determined cubic polynomial using a
three-intercept cryptanalysis.
A. Basic Algorithm
Consider the case when Alice wishes to exchange a single
plaintext given by the real function f(x) ↔ F (k), the
plaintext for f(x = 0) being taken to be redundant due to the
re-normalization condition associated with Equation (2). Alice
generates the random phase cipher Θ1(k) and similarly, Bob
generates random phase cipher Θ2(k). These phase functions
are computed through application of the Fourier transform
method compounded in Equation (5). The algorithm(s)
for generating r(x) from which these phase functions are
generated, are taken to be cryptographically strong and
ideally personal to Alice and Bob through application of an
evolutionary computing approach [6] including the keys used
to seed them. The following steps are then applied.
Step 1: For a given value of c >> 1, known only to
Alice, Alice encrypts F (k) to produce ciphertext S1(k) using
the equation
S1(k) = F (k) exp[iΘ1(k)] + c exp[iΘ1(k)] (6)
and sends Re[s1(x)] of s1(x)↔ S1(k) to Bob.
Step 2: Upon receiving the ciphertext S1(k) ↔ Re[s1(x)],
Bob encrypts S1(k) using the equation
S2(k) = S1(k) exp[iΘ2(k)] (7)
and sends Re[s2(x)] of s2(x)↔ S2(k) back to Alice.
Step 3: Alice decrypts Bobs ciphertext S2(k) ↔ Re[s2(x)]
using the equation
S3(k) = S2(k) exp[−iΘ1(k)] = S1 exp[iΘ2(k)] exp[−iΘ1(k)]
= [F (k) + c] exp[iΘ1(k)] exp[−iΘ1(k)] exp[iΘ2(k)]
= [F (k) + c] exp[iΘ2(k)]
(8)
and sends Re[s3(x)] of s3(x)↔ S3(k) back to Bob.
Step 4: Bob decrypts the ciphertext S3(k)↔ Re[s3(x)] using
the equation
F (k) + c = S3(k) exp[−iΘ2(k)] (9)
The plaintext is then given by Re[f(x)] | x |> 0 where
f(x) ↔ F (k) given that Re[f(0)] is undefined, or, with
application of the re-normalization condition Re[f(0)] = 0.
Note that the value of c used in the first pass can be randomly
generated once the numerical upper bound of this constant has
been established subject to the floating point accuracy used to
undertake Steps 1 - 4.
B. Three-intercept Cryptanalysis
Assume that an attack is launched to estimate f(x) based
on knowledge of the three-pass protocol given in Section IV.A
and accurate records of the functions S1(k), S2(k) and S3(k)
obtained by intercepting the transmission associated with Steps
1-3 (by taking the Fourier transform of the results). Given
Equations (6) - (9), we can then eliminate the ciphers Θ1 and
Θ2 to obtain the equation








| F (k) |2 +c2 , c→∞
(10)
and it is clear that to obtain F (k) we are required to solve
a cubic equation for an unknown value of c >> 1 (which
is known only to Alice, being required for the first pass
only). Equation (10) is under-determined, and, in this context,
has infinitely many complex solutions that are inconsistent
(solutions in an algebraically closed field). Thus a unique
solution for f(x) given knowledge of S1(k), S2(k) and S3(k)
is not possible.
C. Bayesian Cryptanalysis
Bayesian analysis can be used to generate a Maximum Like-
lihood estimate for f(x) given Equation (1). This requires a
model for the statistical distribution of n(x) to be established.
If we consider the case when n(x) is characterized by a
Gaussian PDF, the estimate for f(x), fˆ(x) say, is given by
[7], with G(k)↔ g(x),
fˆ(x) = g∗(x) s(x) where G∗(k) = exp[iΘ(k)]
In regard to phase-only encryption, a known algorithm attack
is required to focus on the phase function Θ(k). This rules
out the ability to develop a useful Bayesian attack because:
(i) the statistical signature of the ciphertext is dominated by
the function Re[n(x)] (providing c >> 1) and the statistical
signature of the plaintext f(x), after diffusion with n(x),
is therefore not available in practice; (ii) even though the
distribution of Re[n(x)] is known, the phase function Θ(k) is
uniformly distributed and Bayesian estimation is not possible
for uniformly distributed variables.
D. Correlation Cryptanalysis
Consider the case when the ciphertext in Step 1 is in-
tercepted. From Equation (6) we can construct the power
spectrum
| S1(k) |2 =| F (k) exp[iΘ1(k)] + c exp[iΘ1(k)] |2







For c >> 1 it is then clear that (in the asymptotic case)
| S1(k) |2=| F (k) |2 +c2, c→∞
or, using the correlation theorem, where S1(k)↔ s1(x),
s∗1(x) s1(x) = f∗(x) f(x) + c2δ(x)
= f∗(x) f(x); | x |> 0, c→∞
Autocorrelating the ciphertext therefore leads to a decryp-
tion problem that is equivalent to the phase retrieval problem,
i.e. given that f(x) ↔ F (k) =| F (k) | exp[iΘ(k)], then
if only | F (k) | is known, we are required to estimate
the phase function Θ(k) upon which f(x) can be obtained
by Fourier inversion. In general, the phase retrieval problem
is severely ill-posed with no uniformly stable solutions in
infinite-dimensional spaces, a result that holds for frames that
are continuous. Moreover, the practicality of implementing
phase retrieval algorithms is dependent on the dimension.
It is well known that for the two-dimensional case, phase
estimation algorithms have been developed to provide approx-
imate solutions, especially in regard to X-ray crystallography,
for example, where the intensity of an X-ray diffraction
pattern in the far-field is determined by the two-dimensional
Fourier transform of the diffracting object (i.e. the crystal)
[8]. However, for the one-dimensional case considered here,
the phase retrieval problem is ambiguousness, the determi-
nation of the phase within the extensive solution set being
challenging and only able to be considered under suitable
a priori assumptions or additional information. This is a
consequence of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra which
states that every single-variable polynomial with complex
coefficients has at least one complex root. This theorem fails
for polynomials of two variables and it is the inability to factor
polynomials of two variables that makes the two-dimensional
phase retrieval possible and prevents the one-dimensional
phase retrieval problem from being solved. This is because
the ability to factor polynomials generates ambiguities where
multiple spectral phases correspond to the same data. Thus any
attack associated with attempting to solve the one-dimensional
phase retrieval problem applied to any one or all of the three
passes can be assumed to fail and the application of phase-only
encryption considered here will therefore remain a significant
challenge for a cryptanalyst. This statement should of course
be appreciated within the context of possible future solutions
to the one-dimensional phase retrieval problem. For example,
it has recently been shown that a signal can be uniquely
recovered from the Fourier amplitude alone if interference
measurements between the unknown signal and a reference
signal (unrelated to the unknown signal) are available [9].
It may also be possible to apply a variation on the theme
of the two-to-one dimensional processing equivalence prin-
ciple via application of the Radon and inverse Radon trans-
forms (Rˆ and Rˆ−1, respectively) first considered in [10] and
compounded in the equation Pˆ2f(x, y) ≡ Rˆ−1Pˆ1Rˆf(x, y)
where Pˆ1 denotes the one-dimensional process and Pˆ2 denotes
the equivalent two-dimensional process (which may or may
not be directly applicable as a two-dimensional processing
algorithm). In this context, an attempt at solving the one-
dimensional phase retrieval problem could be considered using
a one-to-two dimensional processing equivalence principle
based on the equation Pˆ1f(x) ≡ RˆPˆ2Rˆ−1f(x), noting that
Rˆ−1f(x) is a symmetric image to which the two-dimensional
phase retrieval process denoted by Pˆ2 is then applied.
E. Prototype MATLAB Function
Appendix A provides prototype software using MATLAB to
implement the algorithm given in Section IV.A, compounded
in function TPP, an acronym for Three-Pass Protocol. The
function has been designed to transfer a .txt file between two
users (Alice and Bob) and has four inputs: (i) the key - a string
of numbers between 0 and 9 (consisting of a maximum of
10 digits which is the limiting upper bound for a MATLAB
random number generator with a non-negative integer seed
< 232) - used by Alice for the first and third passes and
a different key used by Bob for the second pass and the
final decrypt; (ii) the step which is assigned input values 1
(first pass), 2 (second pass), 3 (third pass) and 4 (for the
final decrypt); (iii) a user-specified filename; (iv) the Spectral
Embedding Constant c which is required for the first pass
(step=1) only. In each of the 1-3, the ciphertext is written
to (and read from for step=2 and step=3) a file with default
filename ‘Ciphertext.txt’. This numerical data is assumed to
be sent (by email, for example) from Alice to Bob (step=1),
from Bob back to Alice (step=2) and from Alice back to Bob
(step=3). After step=3, Bob decrypts the ciphertext to recover
the plaintext which is output to a user specified file. For
each step, the MATLAB functions dmlwrite and/or dmlread
are used for writing and/or reading the ciphertext to a file,
respectively. For step=1, the input to function TPP (after
conversion to an integer array) is zero padded, a zero being
added to the first element of the array. The reason for this
is due to the re-normalization condition which is applied in
step=4 of the same function when the first element of the
decrypt is eliminated from the output, thereby making the re-
normalization process an intrinsic feature of the function and
independent of the input/output data.
A simple graphical example of the data associated with
function TPP is given in Figure 1 which shows line
plots of an input plaintext (a single short sentence con-
sisting of 114 ASCII characters) and output ciphertext’s
associated with the three passes (steps 1-3) for c =
1234.56789 using the keys 1234 and 4321 for step=1, step=3
and step=2, step=4, respectively. These results are associ-
ated with running the function TPP in the following se-
quence: TPP(1234,1,’Plaintext.txt’,1234.56789), TPP(4321,2),
TPP(1234,3), TPP(4321,4,’Decrypt.txt’) where Plaintext.txt is
the input plaintext file (created by Alice) and Decrypt.txt is
the final decrypt (generated by Bob with step=4). Each Ci-
phertext.txt file consists of an array of floating point numbers
with 32 digits whose numerical scale is determined by (but not
directly related to) the magnitude of c. It is noted that none of
the three ciphers correlate with each other but that each cipher
has the same statistical distribution and therefore do correlate
statistically with each other.
Fig. 1. Example plots of plaintext (top-left), first pass ciphertext (bottom-left),
second pass ciphertext (top-right) and third pass ciphertext (bottom-right).
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The material presented in this paper is predicated on proving
the result that if the noise function n(x) given in Equation (1)
is considered to have the same phase-only spectrum, then an
exact deconvolution is available given by Equation (2). This
result has been applied to the exchange of plaintext using a
three-pass protocol without the need to exchange any keys.
Cryptanalysis shows that if the ciphertext is intercepted
in each pass, the arbitrary value of the Spectral Embedding
Coefficient used in the first pass (which can be many tens of
orders of magnitude depending on the floating point precision
available) yields a third order polynomial equation that is
under-determined, i.e. an equation which has no solution.
Bayesian and correlation attacks have been shown to be
invalid, in the latter case, because of the lack of any available
solution to the one-dimensional phase retrieval problem; a
consequence of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra. In this
sense, the method cannot be broken subject, of course, to
the possibility of future exceptions. The algorithm presented
in Appendix A - function TPP - can therefore be used to
exchange any ACSII text data associated with a user-specified
plaintext file. The function can and should be modified and
extended by interested readers to encrypt different data types
as required, the value of c used in the first pass being
automated using, for example, the code
c=rand(1,1)*10ˆ(round(rand(1,1)*6))
which assigns a real random floating point value between 0
and 106 to the SEC.
APPENDIX A
MATLAB FUNCTION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A
THREE-PASS PROTOCOL USING PHASE-ONLY ENCRYPTION
The function given in this Appendix has not been exhaus-
tively tested and has no data error checks. It is provided to
give the reader a guide to the basic programming required to
implement the computational procedures discussed in Section
IV.A. The code given has been commented but is highly
condensed in order to comply with the prescribed page limit
for this publication.
function []=TPP(key,step,filename,c)
%FUNCTION: Exchange plaintext file.
%INPUTS: key-an integer string (0-9)
%with maximum string length of 10 digits.
%step=1-first pass to encrypt plaintext.
%step=2-second pass, encrypt ciphertext.
%step=3-third pass giving first decrypt.
%step=4-output decrypt writing data to
%a user specified file.
%c>>1-constant (for first pass only).
if step==1 %Read plaintext P from file.
fid = fopen(filename,’r’);
P=fscanf(fid, ’%c’); fclose(fid);
P=round(P); %Convert to integers.
%Zero pad the first element of array.
zero=zeros(1,1); P=[zero P];
N=size(P’,1); %Compute size of P.
%Generate cipher using function ’rand’
%seeded by key specified by first user.
rng(key,’twister’); Theta=rand(1,N);
%Compute Phase-Only Spectrum (POS).
POS=exp(i*angle((fft(Theta))));
%Compute phase-only encrypted spectrum
%E and return the real part of ifft.
E=(fft(P).*POS)+c*POS; E=real(ifft(E));
%Write out first pass ciphertext to file
dlmwrite(’Ciphertext.txt’,E, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’,’precision’,32); end
%Processing for step 2 (second pass).
if step==2 %Read first pass ciphertext.
E=dlmread(’Ciphertext.txt’); N=size(E’,1);
%Computer fft of first pass ciphertext
E=fft(E); %and generate new cipher using
%key specified by the second user.
rng(key,’twister’); Theta=rand(1,N);
%Compute phase-only encrypted spectrum,
%return the real component of ifft
E=E.*exp(i*angle((fft(Theta))));
E=real(ifft(E)); %and write data to file.
dlmwrite(’Ciphertext.txt’,E, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’,’precision’,32); end
%Apply processing for step 3 - third pass.
if step==3 %Read second pass ciphertext.
E=dlmread(’Ciphertext.txt’); N=size(E’,1);
%Computer fft of second pass ciphertext
E=fft(E); %and generate cipher using key
%specified by first user.
rng(key,’twister’); Theta=rand(1,N);
%Decrypt phase-only spectrum for first
%pass, return real component of ifft
E=E.*exp(-i*angle((fft(Theta))));
E=real(ifft(E)); %and write data to file.
dlmwrite(’Ciphertext.txt’,E, ...
’delimiter’,’ ’,’precision’,32); end
%Apply processing for step 4 -
%Decryption of third pass cipher.
if step==4 %Read third pass cipher.
E=dlmread(’Ciphertext.txt’); N=size(E’,1);
%Compute fft of second pass cipher
E=fft(E); %and generate cipher seeded
%by key specified by the second user.
rng(key,’twister’); Theta=rand(1,N);
%Decrypt phase-only spectrum, return real
%component of ifft and re-normalize by
%setting first element of the array to 0.
E=E.*exp(-i*angle((fft(Theta))));
P=real(ifft(E)); P(1)=0.0;
%Convert return to integer values,
%and eliminate first element.
P=round(P); P(1)=[];
%Write out decrypt to filename.txt
fid = fopen(filename,’wt’);
fprintf(fid, ’%c’, P); fclose(fid); end
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